Social Innovation and Chinese Overseas Hydropower

Dams: The Nexus of National Social Policy and

Corporate Social Responsibility by Nordensvard, Johan et al.
Social Innovation and Chinese Overseas Hydropower
Dams: The Nexus of National Social Policy and
Corporate Social Responsibility
Johan Nordensvard,1* Frauke Urban2 and Grace Mang3
1Sociology, Social Policy and Criminology, University of Southampton, UK
2Centre for Development, Environment and Policy CeDEP, School of Oriental and African Studies SOAS,
University of London, UK
3International Rivers, China Ofﬁce, Beijing, China
ABSTRACT
The nexus between hydropower dams, social policy and corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a
currently understudied topic. This paper aims to ﬁll parts of this gap by discussing these issues in
relation to the world’s largest builder of hydropower dams, Chinese state-owned enterprise
Sinohydro. This paper draws on the analysis of ﬁrm strategy documents and CSR documents
and gains additional insights from key informant interviews. The research ﬁnds that in 2011
Sinohydro developed its ﬁrst comprehensive policy framework for social and environmental
safeguards that was in line with international standards set by the World Bank/International
Finance Corporation. These policies were however later replaced by weaker, vaguer policy. The
paper suggests there is a need for Sinohydro and other dam-builders to re-engage with social
innovation to mitigate some of the negative social and environmental implications of
hydropower dams. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment
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Introduction
THE NEXUS BETWEEN HYDROPOWER DAMS, SOCIAL POLICY AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (CSR) IS A CURRENTLYunderstudied topic. This paper aims to ﬁll parts of this gap by discussing the nexus between national socialpolicy and CSR in relation to the world’s largest builder and operator of hydropower dams, Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) Sinohydro.
Hydropower dams are experiencing a new renaissance in many parts of the world, particularly in low and middle
income countries, where most of the hydropower potential remains at relatively low levels of exploitation. These
countries have weak formal social policy to remedy some of the social implications of large infrastructure projects such
as dams. Hydropower dams are symbols of economic development in general and low carbon development for climate
change mitigation in speciﬁc. At the same time, large hydropower dams are controversial, as humans and nature have
to make way for these megaprojects. The focus on technological solutions has come at the price of challenging
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sustainable development and neglecting some of the most critical social impacts of large dams, let alone the large en-
vironmental impacts of dams. Large dams present immense social and environmental challenges for local
communities, which can include resettlement of affected individuals and communities, psychological stress, loss or
decline of livelihood and assets, changes to lifestyles and traditions, impacts on ﬁshing, agriculture and food security,
impacts on access to and quality of water and a wide range of environmental adverse effects (Urban et al., 2013).
After decades of hydropower dam-building in low and middle income countries there is still no comprehensive
remedy for the severe impacts on affected local people. The World Commission on Dams (WCD) developed the
frameworkDams and Development: a New Framework for Decision-Making in 2000. The International Hydropower As-
sociation (IHA) launched their own sustainability guidelines in 2004, followed by their Sustainability Assessment
Protocol in 2010. There has also been a rise in assessment techniques such as social impact assessment, multi-
stakeholder platforms and transboundary environmental impact assessments (Mirumachi and Torriti, 2012). The
World Bank had withdrawn itself from funding large hydropower dams in the 1990s, but has in recent years re-
engaged with hydropower projects. The recent increase in Chinese investment in hydropower in low and middle
income countries has not only challenged the prior dominance of the World Bank but it has increased the need to dis-
cuss and analyse the social sustainability of overseas Chinese hydropower dams. China’s ‘Going Out’ strategy has led to
a rising number of Chinese overseas hydropower dams, particularly in low and middle income countries in Asia and
Africa (Bosshard, 2009; McDonald et al., 2009; International Rivers, 2012). Chinese banks and companies have been
involved in more than 330 large Chinese overseas dam projects, most of them in Southeast Asia (38%) and Africa
(26%), of which 81 have been completed and 92 are currently under construction (International Rivers, 2014).
Hensengerth (2013) suggests that the actual implementation of environmental and social guidelines for overseas
dams depends on the local and national circumstances and governance, particularly the national regulations and en-
forcement capabilities of the host country. This becomes even more severe when many of China’s overseas hydro-
power projects are built in countries with weak local governance and/or high corruption. Moreover, many of these
countries have weak informal social security and welfare arrangements, which make affected local stakeholders very
dependent on the contracts that national and local politicians negotiate with powerful Chinese actors.
This article aims to ﬁll the current knowledge gap in discussing the nexus of national social policy and CSR in relation
to Sinohydro. The research question is the following: what is Sinohydro’s stance towards social policy for mitigating the
social and environmental impacts of their overseas dams? The paper ﬁrst aims to conceptualize the role of hydropower
dam-builders in countries with weak formal social policy. In these countries the dam-building ﬁrm needs to step up their
mitigationmeasures to reduce some of the social and environmental impacts of large dams. Second, this paper examines
the social policies of the Chinese dam-builder Sinohydro, the world’s largest dam-building ﬁrm, since the introduction of
their ﬁrst comprehensive policy for social and environmental safeguards in 2011. We examine how Sinohydro’s
conceptualization of CSR has changed in recent years. We found that in 2011 Sinohydro was preparing to close the
gap between their policy and the international standards set by the World Bank/International Finance Corporation
(IFC), which is a sign that Sinohydro was going to incorporate social innovation at a corporate level. These proposed so-
cial innovations were however replaced by weaker policies after the restructuring of Sinohydro. The policy documents
that were released in 2013 and 2014 after the restructuring hark back to a discourse close to the Chinese overall
‘no-strings attached’ approach. The paper suggests there is a need for Sinohydro to re-engage with social innovation
to mitigate some of the negative social implications of hydropower dams and to promote sustainable development.
The following section elaborates the theoretical framework, the next section discusses the role of Chinese-built
and Chinese-funded dams and presents the empirical material, the fourth section discusses the ﬁndings and the
ﬁfth section concludes the paper.
Methodology and Theoretical Framework
Methodology
This paper draws on document analysis, supplemented by key informant interviews. It analyses ﬁrm strategy
documents and CSR documents and gains additional insights from strategic key informants. It analyses four key
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documents from Sinohydro: its Policy Framework for Sustainable Development (2011), its Occupational Health, Safety
and Environmental Policy (2013), its Statement of Ethical Principles (2014a) and its Sustainable Development Policy
(2014b). It analyses these documents with regard to key issues that are of relevance for large dams and their social
and some environmental impacts, such as resettlement and compensation, impacts on livelihoods and natural
resources, the consultation process etc. In addition, 14 interviews with key informants were conducted in 2014,
including representatives from various parts of Sinohydro, Exim Bank, China Three Gorges Corporation, Chinese
embassies in Asia and Africa, Chinese ministries such as the Ministry of Water Resources and Ministry of
Environmental Protection, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and various universities. Most interviews
were conducted in Beijing, China, while some interviews took place at sites and capitals in Asia and Africa where
Sinohydro is constructing dams. The interviewees were chosen based on their expertise and knowledge in the
ﬁeld of study.
The approach to analysing these key issues is detailed in Table 1 and discussed in the following theoretical
framework.
Theoretical Framework
Innovation, Social Innovation and Social Justice
Low carbon technologies in general and large hydropower dams in speciﬁc are being considered as one solution for
climate change mitigation. There is an overarching consensus that technological innovation could solve the fraught
relationship between economic growth, poverty reduction and environmental degradation. Technological innova-
tion is perceived to be an essential part of low carbon development, but often this neglects some of the most critical
social and environmental implications of large dams. The environmental impacts of large dams are wide ranging;
however, the key focus of this paper is on the social impacts of dams. Large dams are considered as controversial
due to their negative social effects and as those who beneﬁt are often not the local population whose lives are directly
affected by the dams (Scudder, 2005).
Innovation can be broadly deﬁned as creating something new, developing a new product, service or idea. Innovation is
often seen as new products, services and ideas that have successfully reached the market (Rogers, 2003). Innovation
systems are highly complex and need to reconcile socio-economic development, environmental sustainability and techno-
logical and innovation capabilities, in both developed and developing countries (Stamm et al., 2009; Urban et al., 2012).
Social innovation has become a separate stream of literature that focuses on the social and political organization of
society. Ockwell and Mallett see ’social innovation’ as ’recognizing new ways of organizing or doing things through
social dimensions’ (2013, p. 118). Andersen et al. deﬁne social innovation as ’the ability to organise bottom linked
collective action/empowerment (including efﬁcient political representation)’, and state that this ’is a condition for
Distributive justice for social innovation
Basic needs of the communities affected by dams met, such as sufﬁcient food, adequate housing, income and extended needs
Employment and opportunities for learning and self-development met
Provision of basic services such as clean water supply, sanitation, reliable electricity supply, schooling/education, health services,
mobility/transportation
Fair distribution of environmental ’bads’ and ’goods’ and natural resources/equality of rights, including human rights, land user
and tenure rights, and indigenous people’s rights
Procedural justice for social innovation
Accountable governance and management of the policy, planning and standard-setting process for dam construction and its
implementation; including holding actors accountable for fulﬁlling their promises and pledges
Social monitoring of the policy, planning and standard-setting process for dam construction and its implementation
Access to participation and decision-making at different stages of the process and over time/proactive stakeholder communication
and consultation throughout the dam planning and construction process
Table 1. Adapted justice for social innovation framework for large hydropower dams, derived and amended from the work of
Boström (2012)
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reaching sustainable democratic and social development’ (2009, p. 283). They argue further that ’[S]ocial inclusion
and integration are impossible without both social conﬂict and democratic dialog’ (2009, p. 283). One of the most
important aspects when analysing hydropower dams and social innovation is the need to go beyond the ﬂawed
system of implementing large hydropower dams with social sustainability being nothing more than an afterthought.
When referring to social innovation in the context of this paper we therefore mean that a new policy, product or
service is being created to minimize the social and environmental impacts of dams and maximize the quality of
people’s lives, livelihoods and assets.
Social justice needs to play an important role here to facilitate social innovation for large hydropower dam projects.
This means that those social groups affected by the dam, who are sometimes already poor and marginalized before
the dam construction, should experience justice through the dam construction. In practice this means that their
quality of life and livelihoods, their assets, income and employments, access to services and social protection would
be guaranteed. Two of the most important aspects here are to facilitate both distributive social justice and procedural
social justice within social innovation.
Distributive justice is concerned with the distribution of resources, hence the fair and equal allocation of environ-
mental resources among diverse groups of citizens and stakeholders (Maiese, 2004). Distributional justice has often
focused on how marginalized groups have been exposed to environmental hazards such as toxic substances or other
environmental issues. Moreover social justice is not just an academic ﬁeld and a policy framework, it is also a social
movement, which entails communities engaging and reacting against environmental bads in the community
(Agyeman, 2005, p. 3). Gender, race, class, impacts of environmental ’bads’ and access to environmental ’goods’
(such quality of life, natural resources or a clean environment) have become the heart of discussing distributive
justice and the environment (Boström, 2012, p. 5).
Procedural justice is concerned with the process of social and environment justice. It deals less with the equal
distribution of resources and more with the direct empowerment and participation of different stakeholders in
environmental processes (Boström, 2012, p. 5). There is an overarching perception in this discourse that most
pollution and environmental degradation is caused by the more afﬂuent and powerful and the environmental con-
sequences hit the poor disproportionately. It is therefore important that the environmental policy decision-making
process for large infrastructure projects such as dams is transparent, just and participative. The importance lies in
creating fair processes for environmental policy-making and policy implementation. There is a perception that, if
policy-making and policy implementation have been fair, participating parties are more likely to accept a disliked
outcome (Deutsch, 2000). Both distributive and procedural social justice are important for ensuring that social
innovation takes place with regard to large dams.
For this paper we use Boström’s framework, which is very much linked up with distributive and procedural
dimensions of social justice. He highlights the need for ’the improvement of conditions for living people and future
generations and the quality of governance of the development process’ (Boström, 2012, p. 5).
We amend Boström’s framework and link social justice with social innovation. We then differentiate between a
’what’ category that covers distributive aspects and a ’how’ category that covers procedural aspects. This article looks
at how distributive justice within social innovation is part of Chinese dam-builders’ CSR; if it can sustain stake-
holders’ basic needs, support local stakeholders employment opportunities/livelihoods and also provide them
with basic services. This looks at the redistributive aspect of corporate citizenship. The second aspect that we look
at is procedural justice within social innovation; how accountable the process is, if there is social monitoring,
transparent information and communication, and how open the process is to participation (Boström, 2012).
A socially sustainable and just hydropower dam project would need to safeguard the affected people’s basic
needs, employment and basic services as well as guaranteeing that the overall project and the dam-builders and
government agencies are accountable, providing good social monitoring and opening up spaces for participation
by the affected people and communication with dam-builders, government agencies and the affected people.
Social Policy and CSR
One of the most difﬁcult areas for mitigating the social adverse effects of hydropower projects is the lack of structure
and responsibility in responding to these challenges. Many of the most disputed hydropower dam projects have
taken place in ecologically sensitive natural environments and in poorer middle and low income countries, often
relying on strained communities and kinship groups. Gough and Wood have discussed the concept of informal
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security regimes and insecurity regimes (Gough and Wood, 2006), which describes low and middle income countries
where the state cannot offer comprehensive or even basic welfare services. Many developing countries have an
informal welfare system that relies more on informal communities and informal social services. Gough and
Wood discuss the nature of informal security arrangements, where rights and duties are often informal and
people rely heavily upon community and family relationships to meet their security needs (Gough and Wood,
2006, pp. 1699–1700).
Many of the countries that attract investment in hydropower from China are countries with little formal welfare
service from the state and a high reliance on families and communities for welfare, and not seldom a dependence
on international aid and charities. Hydropower dams may risk not only undermining individuals’ but also whole
communities’ ability to provide welfare arrangements for members and kin. As the state cannot provide an adequate
safety net in many developing countries, people adversely affected by dams become extremely vulnerable to changes
to their lives and livelihoods. In these cases, corporations and investment banks will have a disproportionate impact
on vulnerable people in affected areas. The lack of responsibility of many corporations and investment banks has
created much suffering amongst the poor and marginalized in areas affected by large dams. It is therefore important
to acknowledge that corporations and investments banks carry a social responsibility towards their investments and
construction projects in developing countries.
This creates a new reframing of how we understand CSR. Traditionally, corporations have not been perceived to
replace the work of the state and CSR has been rather limited in scope. Carroll has authored the most widely used
deﬁnition of CSR: CSR should be understood to be ’being proﬁtable, obeying the law, being ethical, and “giving back”
to the community’ (2000, p. 37). What is needed from builders, operators and managers of hydropower dams must go
beyond philanthropic ventures (Blumberg, 1972; Henning, 1973; Sheikh, 1996) to a larger obligation ‘to take proper
legal, moral–ethical, and philanthropic actions that will protect and improve the welfare of both society and business
as a whole’ (Anderson, 1989, p. 9). This is due to the large social and environmental impacts that large dams can have.
Matten and Crane have discussed views to extend our understanding of CSR but have focused mostly on
developed countries. One of the most interesting aspects of expanding our understanding of corporate citizenship
and CSR involves the corporations taking over responsibilities that in developed countries have been identiﬁed to
belong to the state. Matten and Crane argue that corporations’ involvement in the citizenship arena is more similar
to the involvement of governments. At the same time, corporations have become more and more responsible for
the administration of social, civil and political citizenship rights: a domain that was traditionally seen to belong
to the nation state (Matten and Crane, 2005). This could mean the deliverance and allocation of public goods and
the deﬁnition and administration of citizenship rights. The corporations share a horizontal dimension with govern-
ments and are in a vertical relationship with the citizens within a political community (Matten and Crane, 2005).
Corporations become active in certain areas of social innovation where government has not been. Since developing
countries countries often lack local governance, corporations could step in and surrogate governments, for example
by ensuring that employees have an adequate living wage or by ﬁnancing schools for child workers. Many of these
questions have for better or worse been reconﬁgured through multinational corporations and their activities
(Matten and Crane, 2008, pp. 36–38).
The main questions here is whether, when a hydropower project takes place in low or middle income countries, the
dam-building ﬁrm can mitigate its social and environmental impacts and compensate for the lack of formal state
welfare. A worst case scenario would be that informal communities are undermined by hydropower dams and cannot
deliver the informal services the individuals, families and marginalized group need. This becomes more severe when
the country has no welfare infrastructure and the ﬁrm has taken little social responsibility towards local people. It is
therefore important to analyse and discuss the role of social innovation a ﬁrm such as Sinohydro takes to mitigate
some of the social adverse effects and to make the overall project more socially sustainable and socially just.
Chinese-Funded and Chinese-Built Overseas Hydropower Dams
While China has a long history of domestic dam-building, Chinese dam-builders are relatively new to the interna-
tional dam industry and have had a rapid increase in activity in recent years (Urban et al., 2013). Chinese dam-
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builders and ﬁnanciers tend to differ from other dam-builders and ﬁnanciers due to their bundling of aid, trade and
investments; the role of SOEs that are backed by abundant state funding; their own distinctive way of handling
(and not seldom underestimating) social and environmental impacts; their pragmatic approach to regional politics
and political alliances; and their lower prices, which pose a challenge to competitors (Urban et al., 2013;
Hensengerth, 2013; see also Tan-Mullins and Mohan, 2013). With regard to Chinese overseas dam projects, Chinese
banks and companies have been involved in over 330 Chinese overseas dams, most of them in Southeast Asia and
Africa. The great majority of these are large dams, of which 81 have been completed and 92 have commenced
construction since 2000 (International Rivers, 2014), at a time when many other dam-building nations and organi-
zations, particularly those from the OECD, were withdrawing from the dam-building industry.
Sometimes governments ask dam-builders to build dams according to speciﬁc pre-arranged plans and condi-
tions. Dam-builders such as Sinohydro may be on other occasions involved in planning the dam and how it should
be designed, engineered and constructed, which often includes major decisions about the size of the dam, generat-
ing capacity, size of the reservoir that will ﬂood the area etc. This can also include making major decisions with con-
sequences for individual people, villages, towns, agricultural land and cultural sites that will be affected by the dam-
building and the ﬂooding of the area. While Sinohydro is mainly the contractor, there are several cases where the
ﬁrm has acted as a project developer for build–operate–transfer (BOT) projects, for example at the Kamchay Dam
in Cambodia. In such situations they may contribute to decisions about compensation payments, including how
much money is made available. In many countries around the world, developers are required to conduct an environ-
mental impact assessment (EIA) or an environmental and social impact assessment (ESIA) so that the environmen-
tal and social impacts of the dams are evaluated and mitigation measures are developed (such as resettlements and
compensation, rescue missions for animals before the reservoir ﬂooding, planting new trees after the ﬂooding etc.).
Compared with project contractors, developers are therefore more aware of the full extent of the dam-building and
its impacts and can make informed decisions about its sustainability and whether or not a project should go ahead.
This paper examines Sinohydro’s stance towards social policy for mitigating the social and environmental im-
pacts of their overseas dams. In Table 2 we list the ﬁrm‘s corporate policies from 2011 to 2014. 2011 was the ﬁrst
year that a comprehensive social and environmental policy was ofﬁcially developed by Sinohydro. We also examine
how Sinohydro’s conceptualization of CSR changed recently.
Sinohydro
Policy Framework for Sustainable Development
Sinohydro’s documentation of social policy has rarely been made public in a transparent and coherent way. There
was an attempt in 2011 to adapt international norms for hydropower dam projects. The most important document
that was publically accessible is Sinohydro’s policy commitments from its Policy Framework for Sustainable
Development (Sinohydro, 2011; International Rivers, 2012) in 2011. This document adopted World Bank standards
as a minimum, for example with regard to resettlements. The World Bank and IFC Performance Standards are
the latest international standards on dam-building. Standards are appropriately developed by public institutions
such as governments, the United Nations and the World Bank, not by corporate actors. Having standards set by
Organization Document Year Nature of document
Sinohydro Policy Framework for
Sustainable Development
2011 catalogue of commitments; references to other
internal and external documents
Sinohydro Occupational Health, Safety
and Environmental Policy
2013 brief statement with lack of details
Sinohydro Statement of Ethical Principles 2014 longer statement, which lack details concerning
social implications and CSR
Sinohydro Sustainable Development Policy 2014 list of principles similar to the document released
in 2011 but far shorter and with less detail on CSR
Table 2. Documents on social and environmental guidelines by Sinohydro
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different corporate actors would lead to a proliferation of different standards that are difﬁcult to implement and
monitor. Corporate actors, such as Sinohydro and other dam-builders, have been asked to adopt and follow existing
standards. Sinohydro fares better than its Chinese competitors with regard to social policy. In particular, smaller,
local SOEs do not have social policy guidelines and do not adhere to World Bank standards. In this sense, it was
innovative for Sinohydro to adopt standards that were prepared by and for public ﬁnancial institutions such as
the World Bank and the IFC.
In addition to the World Bank standards, legal compliance and environmental assessment policies are driven by
Sinohydro’s own policy documents, while resettlements and community consultations polices have been adopted to
World Bank standards (eight policy commitments from 12 overall). The distributive dimension is less developed
than the procedural dimension.
The focus for the distributive justice dimension of social innovation is on resettlement arrangements, which
should include livelihood options and resettlement site options and set out compensation and new community
infrastructure. Dams are not supposed to be built in national parks or habitats of endangered species. The Policy
Framework for Sustainable Development document states that, if the host country government’s resettlement mea-
sures do not meet Sinohydro’s policy standards, Sinohydro will prepare a supplemental resettlement plan that will
address its policy commitments. Sinohydro claims that displaced persons will at a minimum keep their former
living standard, income earning capacity and production levels. Most of the document is focused on distributive
justice dimensions of social innovation, such as consultations with local communities and stakeholders on EIA
(World Bank’s Operational Policy on Environmental Assessment) and that the relevant information has been
disclosed to affected communities on the nature of the projects, including duration, risks, engagement process
and grievance mechanism (IFC Performance Standard). Sinohydro itself aims to conduct sufﬁcient consultations
with relevant stakeholders and respond to their concerns. If indigenous people are involved, Sinohydro aims to
obtain their consent. Sinohydro also promises that compensation standards are transparent and applied consistently.
Sinohydro does not use social policy as a concept but focuses on the term ’resettlement measures’. The promise
of replacing host countries’ potentially inadequate resettlement measures with Sinohydro’s own standard or
restoring displaced persons to their former living standard would imply a social policy that replaces or expands upon
possibly inadequate local welfare arrangements. What is missing from the policy document is a discussion and an
analysis of Sinohydro’s policy standards vis-a-vis the existing welfare arrangements in low income and middle
income countries. These documents may be a step forwards for Sinohydro to a more comprehensive social
policy framework.
However, after senior management prepared and reviewed the Policy Framework for Sustainable Development in
2011, it avoided publicizing the policy only six months later when Sinohydro was restructured. The company was
restructured as Sinohydro Resources and Sinohydro International, while PowerChina was created as a parent
company owned by the government’s State Administration for State-Owned Enterprises. This also meant that
the newly introduced Policy Framework for Sustainable Development, which largely followed World Bank standards,
was replaced by new, weaker policy documents in subsequent years following the company’s restructuring.
Occupational Health, Safety and Environmental Policy
One of the post-restructuring documents, Occupational Health, Safety and Environmental Policy from 2013, is a step
back in detail and provides more broad and general commitment to providing ’a safe and healthy workplace,
complying with local legislation, international standards and company’s requirements to protect the environment’
(Sinohydro, 2013, p. 1). This document focuses on work-related issues such as health and safety for personnel
and reframes environmental issues and challenges within the same framework. ’We believe that all work related
injuries, illness and environmental incidents are preventable, and we will respect our neighbours and contribute
to the environment in which we operate’ (Sinohydro, 2013:1). This highlights a change of focus, where the overall
environment is mentioned in the same breath as the health of personnel. There are no real commitments to social
standards and no indications of how Sinohydro will contribute to the overall environment in the particular area.
Moreover, this document relates more ambiguously to international standards compared with the previous policy
documents. It does not refer to the international standards developed by the World Bank and the IFC. Sinohydro
should be ‘committed to taking all appropriate measures to provide a safe and healthy workplace, complying with
local legislation, international standards and company’s requirements to protect the environment’, but it becomes
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more ambiguous later on in this brief document, as they state that Sinohydro will ‘[e]stablish, implement and
develop the Health, Safety and Environmental Management System in compliance with relevant standards and
regulatory requirements’ (Sinohydro, 2013, p. 1).
Statement of Ethical Principles
In Sinohydro’s policy document Statement of Ethical Principles from 2014 (Sinohydro, 2014a) the ﬁrm continues to
display a U-turn on social innovation and CSR. This policy document does not refer to the international standards
developed by the World Bank and the IFC. The document ﬁrst and foremost focuses on the ’health and safety of our
employees’, but adds that they are also committed to ’any other persons who may be affected by our operations’
(2014a, p. 6). The tone is less deﬁned in their commitment to both distributive and procedural social innovation.
The document states that Sinohydro has the ’responsibility to prevent injury, ill health, damage and loss arising
from our operations as well as to comply with all regulatory or other legal requirements pertaining to safety, health,
and the environment’ (2014a, p. 6). It is no longer mentioned that national parks or World Heritage areas are no-go
areas for dam projects. The goals are much more ambiguously put: Sinohydro should be ’limiting the impact of our
business activities on the environment’ and ’continue to take steps to preserve biodiversity and affected ecosystems,
protect World Heritage areas, and to restore any disturbed areas in a timely manner’ (2014a, p. 6). This is a step
back from the document in 2011 and more ambiguous on what is allowed and not allowed.
This ambiguity continues as the document states that Sinohydro will ‘participate in the social and economic life
of the communities in which we work, both within and outside China’ (2014a, p. 7). The strongest passage for social
innovation relates to the following:
In our overseas projects we support and help to provide access to health, education, and integration for
underprivileged populations. We are committed to an open dialogue with all of our stakeholders – our owners
as well as local partners, public and governmental institutions, NGOs, local associations, et cetera – to mitigate
disturbances created by our operations, working in compliance with local cultural and community practices.
We also seek to make a lasting positive impact in our host countries, including whenever possible by
recruiting and training local workers and by promoting their professional development (2014a, p. 7).
Sustainable Development Policy
In 2014 Sinohydro also issued a new Sustainable Development Policy (Sinohydro, 2014b). This policy document does
not refer to the international standards developed by the World Bank and the IFC. It also does not refer to the social
innovation aspects mentioned in its Statement of Ethical Principles. This highlights that Sinohydro has not developed
a coherent policy on CSR. The turn that Sinohydro has taken has more to do with protecting its own employees than
the local community that is affected by its activities. The document states the importance to ‘create long term jobs’,
‘foster career development of our employees’ and share the ‘fruits of the company’s growth and proﬁts’ (Sinohydro,
2014b, p. 2). The focus is far more direct and now just includes mention of respecting ‘local culture, religion and
customs’, ‘providing locals with skills training and equal employment and business opportunities’ and ‘to contribute
to the local society development’ (Sinohydro, 2014b, p. 2). It is rather vague as, the document states the need to
integrate sustainability into purchasing and procurement processes and the rather ambiguous promises to improve
the consistence ’with company’s social responsibility objectives while in pursuit of mutual beneﬁcial relationship’
(Sinohydro, 2014b, p. 2).
Now Sinohydro is only committed to limiting the impact of Sinohydro’s business activities on the environment
and is promising rather vaguely to take steps to preserve biodiversity and affected ecosystems (Sinohydro, 2014b).
Moreover, the general aim to have an open and effective dialogue and communication mechanism to exchange
information with communities when it comes to the environment is bland at best. In the end, the change of
Sinohydro’s CSR practices has also meant a roll-back of responsibilities. The document only promises to ’respond
in an active manner to any complaints and/or grievances’ (Sinohydro, 2014b, p. 7) that arise from customers,
employees, subcontractors, communities and authorities. The focus on the local stakeholders has been lost in the
2014 policy document, and they are just one of many stakeholders and by no means a priority for Sinohydro.
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Discussion
Within the context of this paper, social innovation means that a new policy, product or service is being created to
minimize the social and environmental impacts of dams and maximize the quality of affected people’s lives,
livelihoods and assets. Our analysis shows that in 2011 Sinohydro was planning to introduce a social innovation into
their organization when they appeared to integrate international social standards into their projects.
This included promises to ensure that resettled people would at least be able to maintain their living standard
after relocation or that otherwise Sinohydro would step in when the host country’s social policies could not fulﬁl
its role towards the affected population. The attempt to introduce global standards in 2011 was shelved just after
the restructuring of Sinohydro in the same year. World Bank policies were used as a blueprint for Sinohydro’s
CSR in 2011, but this changed in 2013 and 2014 towards a more vague corporate and legal focus on business ethics
rather than social sustainability. This is presented in Table 3.
CSR approach Distributive dimensions
of social innovation
Procedural dimensions
of social innovation
Social policy dimensions
Sinohydro There has been a slide in
how Sinohydro deﬁnes
its distributive
responsibility. In the
ﬁrst policy document
from 2011 Sinohydro
focused on resettlement
arrangements close to
the international
standards of the World
Bank. Sinohydro
promised to supplement
host countries failing
resettlement measures
and claimed that
displaced persons will at
a minimum keep their
former living standard,
income earning capacity
and production levels.
The later documents
from 2013 and 2014
backtrack these
promises and offer
broader ambiguous
promises. Most of the
CSR pledges are
towards employees,
customers and economic
stakeholders.`
All documents have
focused on the
procedural aspect of
CSR. There has been a
change of focus from
consultations with local
communities and
stakeholders on EIAs in
2011 towards a more
corporate focus on legal
aspects such as anti-
corruption, avoiding
fraud/criminal activities
and conﬂict of interests
in 2013 and 2014. There
is far more focus on
describing Sinohydro’s
relationship with a more
limited group of
stakeholders such as
customers, suppliers,
sub-contractors,
representatives and
governments. The later
policy documents focus
far less on the affected
communities and far
more on the general
procedural principles of
fair competition.
Sinohydro does not use
social policy as a concept
but focuses on the term
‘resettlement measures’ in
the early documents. This
however neglects those
people that have been
affected by dams
(for example by declining
livelihoods and limited
access to natural
resources), but not been
resettled. Most of the
social policy measures
are adapted World Bank/IFC
performance standards in
its 2011 policy. Most of
these pledges have been
dropped in the later
policy documents from
2013 and 2014, which
make only vague
promises of ‘support and
help to provide access to
health, education, and
integration for underprivileged
populations’ and ‘mitigate
disturbances created by
our operations, working
in compliance with local
cultural and community
practices’ (Sinohydro,
2014a, p. 7). Compared
with the ﬁrst document (2011)
the development in 2013
and 2014 has been retrograded.
Table 3. Sinohydro’s CSR approach
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One has to discuss how far the above mentioned policies merely exist on paper rather than being implemented in
practice. In the past the actual implementation of adequate social innovation lagged behind, as existing dams show.
For example, the 2011 Policy Framework for Sustainable Development deﬁned national parks as excluded from dam
development. A project should not ‘occur in a national park, habitat of threatened species or protected wetlands,
which are no-go zones for project development’ (Sinohydro, 2011, p. 1). Yet, several recent large dams by Sinohydro
have been built in national parks, such as the Bui Dam in Bui National Park in Ghana and the Kamchay Dam in
Bokor National Park in Cambodia, while the Bakun Dam in Borneo, East Malaysia, is located in the habitat of
threatened species such as the orang-utan as well as on customary indigenous people’s land (Urban et al., 2015).
These dams were already under construction at the time the policy was being developed and approved by senior
management. Therefore, a substantial change in the way business was being done would have been required to
follow the new policy. This also raises the question of whether and to what extent Chinese dam-builders such as
Sinohydro have learned from their past mistakes. Learning from past mistakes seems limited following the
replacement with weaker policies of the 2011 framework policy, which was to date the most advanced social and
environmental policy, in line with World Bank standards.
Another challenge is caused by the vague wording of the current policies in place. Vague wording can leave room
for sub-standard practice. For example, what does ‘consent’ from indigenous people mean prior to dam-building
mean? This exercise may be limited to tokenistic consultation events rather than taking into account the views
and needs of the local population, offering alternatives to lost income or livelihoods and looking for alternative
dam sites or alternative energy options when local opposition arises.
This paper highlights the importance of both technological innovation and social innovation. While China
spends a considerable amount of investment capital in low carbon development and low carbon technologies, it
has spent far less resources in coupling this with social innovation. This becomes more and more important, as
China has been following a ‘Going Global’ strategy in an attempt to access new markets and create global corporate
champions in the hydropower sector.
In the mid-2000s, China started to rethink its ’no-strings attached’ policy. In January 2007, Cheng Siwei, Vice-
Chairman of the Standing Committee of the People’s Congress, warned that ‘irresponsible practices’ had
prevented Chinese companies from expanding their businesses abroad. He predicted ‘Even in developing
countries, foreign companies that turn a blind eye to their social responsibilities will be kicked out of the market’
(McDonald et al., 2009, p. S302).
The economic and public costs of hydropower dams in ecologically and socially sensitive areas make some
Western ﬁrms occasionally wary of these investment opportunities. Rather than taking on this cautionary approach,
Sinohydro’s attempt to implement international standards were dropped even before they were implemented in
practice. The social innovation of the early policy documents from 2011 would have been a big step forward for more
sustainable and accountable hydropower practice. This would have meant that a Chinese SOE would have
abandoned its infamous ’no-strings attached’ policy and shown some genuine interests in the lives of people and
their livelihoods affected by the dams. Sinohydro would have stepped up to take the role towards the affected local
communities that would have been expected of a state. Instead, these plans were shelved and Sinohydro removed
itself in both theory and practice from any comprehensive implementation of CSR.
As Sinohydro is an SOE there are two solutions to promote social innovation for the ever-growing investments
from China in the future: one option would be that China’s enterpises and ﬁnanciers such as Sinohydro and Exim
Bank or China Development Bank participate in shaping a more proactive global CSR for hydropower investment,
following international standards such as those of the World Bank/IFC and the Equator Principles for the ﬁnancial
sector. Beckmann and Pies suggest argue that to some degree it would be in many corporations’ interest if they
accepted ’ordo-responsibility in rule-setting processes and rule-ﬁnding discourse’ (2008, p. 54). The corporations
would not just obey regulations and ethics but actually create and monitor such regulations. Such governance does
not produce hard laws, but soft laws, which mean they lack the possibility of legal sanctions. These regulations are
deliberative and consensual; they take for granted a more cooperative relationship between governments and
corporations (Mörth, 2008, p. 107).
The second option would be that China’s enterpises such as Sinohydro shape their own polices rather than
adopting external rules, regulations and international standards. It is however regrettable that many of the social
policies of Sinohydro and other dam-builders and dam-ﬁnanciers are not effective. There is therefore a need for
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social innovation to mitigate the adverse affects of large hydropower dams for affected people, their livelihoods and
their local environment. This is not only restricted to speciﬁc ﬁrms or countries, but is needed on a global level.
Conclusion
This paper has contributed to narrowing some of the current knowledge gap with regard to Chinese overseas
hydropower dams and social policy. The paper’s research question aimed to examine the stance of Chinese SOE
Sinohydro, the world’s largest dam-builder, towards social policy for mitigating the social and environmental
impacts of their overseas dams. The paper discussed the nexus of national social policy and CSR in relation to
Sinohydro. The paper ﬁrst highlighted that in countries with weak formal social policy the dam-building ﬁrm needs
to step up its mitigation measures to reduce some of the social and environmental impacts of large dams. The paper
then examined the social policies of Sinohydro since the introduction of their ﬁrst comprehensive policy framework
for social and environmental safeguards in 2011. The paper found that in 2011 Sinohydro was closing the gap
between their policy and the international standards set by the World Bank/IFC, which are signs that Sinohydro
was going to incorporate social innovation at a corporate level. While the World Bank standards leave room for
improvement, they represent at least international practice. The publicization of these policies was however avoided
later through the restructuring of Sinohydro and they were superseded by weaker, vaguer policy in 2013 and 2014.
The policy documents that were released after the restructuring hark back to a discourse close to the Chinese overall
‘no-strings attached’ approach, reducing social innovation to a minimum. The paper suggests that there is a need for
Sinohydro to re-engage with social innovation to mitigate some of the negative social implications of hydropower
dams, for example by adhering again to World Bank standards or the IHA Hydropower Sustainability Assessment
Protocol. Social safeguards need to be taken more seriously, particularly with regard to resettlement, compensation,
livelihood impacts and consultation processes. This also applies to other dam-builders, including from OECD coun-
tries, particularly those that disregard the large social and environmental impacts of dams.
This paper has shown that, for the case of Sinohydro, CSR fails to replace state-driven social policy to mitigate the
adverse effects of large dams on affected people and their livelihoods and the environment. Some argue that CSR
has reached its peak and that a new approach to the regulation of corporate social power is needed (Altman and
Vidaver-Cohen, 2000; Waddock and Smith, 2000). Further research is needed into how social innovation can be
better adopted in the dam-building sector, how the policies and standards of dam-builders and ﬁnanciers can be
improved and how CSR can be an integral element of ﬁrms’ best practice rather than a tag-on.
In line with these thoughts, we suggest that there needs to be a global benchmark system of dam-building
ﬁrms that ranks them according to their social and environmental perfomance and a compulsory, global code
of conduct for social innovation for international hydropower projects that goes beyond the current policies. This
would apply not only to Chinese dam-builders but to dam-builders from any other nation too. This would be one
way of holding dam-builders accountable even in countries where states fail to provide adequate social policy as a
response to the impacts of large dams. This approach could contribute to sustainable development in the hydro-
power sector.
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